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ABSTRACT 
In Alaska, many recreational fishermen gain access to Pacific halibut 
(Hippoglossus stenolepis) with knowledgeable captains aboard chartered sportfishing 
boats. Traditionally, and when viewed against a backdrop of commercial fishing effort, 
management agencies and the fishing public perceived recreational fishing as harmless in 
terms of stock depletion. Recent research suggests this perception is false. Management 
for the charter fishery has been evolving since 1993, consuming countless hours of 
industry and management time and resources, still with no settled plan in place. The 
charter fleet requires a long-term management strategy so that charter operators can plan 
their businesses for the long-term. This paper addresses management of marine 
recreational fishing in general, focusing on the Alaska halibut charter fishery. 
Part of the challenge with the halibut charter fishery's management development 
is a lack of definition of recreational fishing effort. I attempt to build an approach to 
recreational fishery management by segmenting recreational fishing effort into separate 
categories, selecting those categories present in the Alaska halibut charter fishery, and 
discussing management tools which may satisfy the needs of that fishing effort. 
Fishermen in the charter fishery are a diverse group with multiple aims for their fishing 
trips, which range from high halibut landings to broad recreational experiences in the 
Alaska wilderness. I suggest queue and lottery type distribution mechanisms, combined 
with elements of traditional open access tools already common in fisheries, as possible 
resolutions to the delayed development of a charter halibut management plan. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Alaska Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) charter fishery is poorly 
understood. This paper argues that management's weak overall grasp of the reasons why 
recreational fishermen choose to fish is a troublesome contributor to management in the 
Alaska fishery, and with recreational fisheries management more generally. This paper 
presents the halibut charter fishery's dilemma in two parts. The first is an attempt to 
describe the current management conflict in the Alaska halibut charter fishery. The 
second proposes a means to assess the conflict and generate resolutions to what has 
proved an intractable management problem. Having discussed these two elements, this 
paper proposes an approach to improve recreational fisheries management in Alaska. 
The halibut charter fishery in Alaska is a guided fishery, and is just one part of 
Alaska's licensed recreational halibut fishery. Although this is the case, the charter 
fishery suffers from an identity crisis at the hands of the various governmental bodies 
tasked with its management. Frequently questioned is its role as either a commercial or a 
recreational fishery, or some amalgam thereof. This presents a key flaw in charter fishery 
management, since the tools available for commercial fisheries do not necessarily work 
for recreational fisheries, and vice versa. The halibut charter fishery does provide access 
for recreational fishermen, but the charter operators themselves are commercial 
businesses. Management will struggle to satisfy the charter fishery unless the various 
management organizations and the charter fleet itself can come to some agreement on 
what the charter fishery is first. For the remainder of this work I take another tack on the 
challenge in charter fishery management and focus mostly on those licensed to harvest 
halibut, the recreational fishermen themselves. 
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To recreationally fish for halibut in Alaska today, all a fisherman needs to do is 
purchase a recreational fishing license from the Alaska Department of Fish and Game 
(ADFG). Licenses are available online at ADFG's site, or at a number of other locations 
around the State. Once a fisherman obtains a license, he or she may fish for a number of 
allowed species, including halibut, without further permissions, tickets, stamps, etc. The 
process is purposefully simple and straightforward, dedicated to providing smooth access 
for recreational fishermen. Pursuing halibut is more complicated because of the halibut's 
range and depth, so a boat is almost always a necessity. This is where the guided halibut 
fishery finds its market, in fishermen who otherwise are unable to get to the fish in deep 
water and in remote locations. Recreational halibut fishermen use the same license 
whether they are fishing from a chartered vessel or fishing privately. This license is 
managed through ADFG, and currently allows for recreational landings totaling two 
halibut per day. Four halibut is the maximum that any angler can possess at one time, 
though once the fish are processed in some manner on shore, a fisherman may continue 
fishing his daily limit. This means, that on a three-day trip, a fisherman could catch his 
limit on the first and second day, process and freeze his catch on shore, then fish for an 
additional two halibut on the third day. There are no maximum annual catch or size limits 
(ADFG 2006a). Although the charter fishery is one part of the recreational halibut 
fishery, it is the dominant method in both effort and landings for recreational fishermen 
to access halibut. It is now generally identified as a fishery in its own right, largely 
separate from non-chartered fishing effort. 
Halibut is highly prized for its tender white meat, and is widely known as a 
culinary delicacy among fishes. Halibut are difficult to obtain, but the Alaska halibut 
8 
charter fleet is good at providing fishing opportunities for clients. Their success has 
spurred rapid annual growth in the fleet since the 1980s (See section 3). Many local 
commerce organizations and the charter fleet itself are very pleased with the charter 
fleet's growth. Some groups, like the North Pacific Fisheries Management Council 
(NPFMC, hereafter Council), are concerned about the charter fleet's unhindered growth, 
and others, like the commercial halibut fishery, are worried. Some individuals are 
downright contemptuous about the halibut charter fleet's success. In Sitka during the 
2006 summer fishing season, bumper stickers appeared on a few vehicles stating 'charter 
fishing is an organized crime.' Development of a sound management plan for the charter 
fishery is ongoing. In 2001 the Council approved an Individual Fisheries Quota program 
for the charter fleet, but after a series of procedural delays this program was rescinded 
prior to implementation in 2005 (NPFMC 2005a). My intention is to cast some light on 
the current management dilemmas in the Alaska halibut charter fishery, and also to 
provide a discussion sufficiently general for wider recreational fisheries management use. 
The reasons for examining the Alaska charter halibut fishery are threefold. First, the U.S. 
fisheries management process has failed to realize a well-developed management plan for 
the Alaska charter fleet for well over a decade. Second, the conflict between the 
commercial and recreational/charter halibut fisheries is characteristic of the tension 
between different fisheries user groups. Third, finding methods to ease management 
conflicts within recreational fisheries is generally important in light of recreational 
fishing's global growth. 
Since 1993, the Council has worked on the allocation issue between the 
recreational halibut charter fishery and the commercial halibut longline fishery. The 
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allocation is derived from the halibut population's Constant Exploitation Yield (CEY), as 
determined by the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC). First the IPHC 
determines by management area the halibut total exploitable biomass (Figure 1). To find 
the annual CEY for each management area, the IPHC applies a fixed harvest rate 
(comparable to F0 I) to the estimated exploitable biomass. The total amount harvestable 
under the applied fixed harvest rate becomes the year's CEY. Directed halibut fisheries, 
which include the commercial fisheries in all regulatory areas from the Aleutian Islands 
to the continental United States, and sport fisheries in British Columbia (Area 2B), 
Washington, and Oregon (both states are Area 2A), receive a fishery CEY, from which 
the regional management authority will determine a final allocation for each area. The 
annual fishery CEY is the difference between the CEY and an estimate of all unallocated 
uses, which include "bycatch of legal-sized fish, wastage of legal-sized fish in the halibut 
fishery, fish taken for personal use, and sport catch except in Areas 2A and 2B" (45, 
IPHC 2005). 
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Fig. 1. International Pacific Halibut Commission Management Areas (IPHC 2006). 
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The commercial longline fishery argues that it is losing an ever-larger percentage 
of the CEY to the halibut charter fishery. The IPHC currently includes the charter fishery 
in its list of unallocated uses, and deducts charter landings from the fishery CEY 
(NPFMC 2001b). This role for charter landings in the IPHC process is the result of 
policy decisions prior to the charter fishery's recent growth. It is probably fair to say that 
settling this allocation issue has proven a greater challenge than originally anticipated. 
The Council has worked for fourteen years on a comprehensive management plan for the 
charter halibut fishery, and the issue is still unsettled (NPFMC 2006b ). The situation in 
Alaska is especially complex; involving parties from the international (IPHC), federal 
(National Marine Fisheries Service), regional (Council), state (ADFG), commercial, and 
non-charter recreational fisheries in addition to the charter fleet itself. Each player in the 
Alaska charter issue seems to hold a different view of the purpose of the charter fleet or 
why recreational fishermen choose to hire a fishing charter, and the differing views make 
evaluating appropriate management strategies problematic. Council involvement in 1993 
formalized the halibut fishery's conflict, but tension has always existed between Alaska's 
varied halibut fisheries. 
The different governmental groups interact in unique ways compared to other 
Pacific fisheries. Halibut, a trans-boundary stock, is managed under the Northern Pacific 
Halibut Act (16 U.S.C Sec.773 1982) and the Magnuson Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (MSA, 16 U.S.C. Sec.1801 1996). The Halibut Act overrides 
portions of the MSA and delegates oversight of halibut to the IPHC. The IPHC is a 
jointly-funded Canada/United States research and management organization. As 
explained earlier, the IPHC conducts halibut population assessments and allocates the 
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annual CEY to commercial fisheries along the entire West Coast and sport fisheries from 
British Columbia to the continental United States. Once they determine the fishery CEY, 
it is up to the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) in Canada and the Council 
process in the United States to allocate halibut further, including setting bag limits and 
other controls for recreational fisheries. ADFG operates at present as a data gathering 
and end-point management group for the IPHC and the Council, and has a voting seat on 
the Council. Unlike other licensed recreational fisheries in Alaska, ADFG is only one 
part of the process rather than the sole custodian of recreational halibut management in 
Alaska. It is unique that ADFG is so removed from the management of a recreational 
fishery, given that most U.S. recreational fisheries fall under state management. 
Depending on the waters fished, commercial fisheries come under both state and Council 
management. 
In the 1970s ADFG created a charter registration for Alaska's various ocean-
going guided sport fisheries. According to ADFG Sport fish division's Deputy Director, 
the charter fleet "operated in a vacuum" without any specific guidelines for operator 
qualifications, vessel safety standards, or specific fishing regulations. 1 Despite this lack 
of focused charter management measures, ADFG still required recreational halibut 
fishing licenses and fishermen were required to follow all other applicable recreational 
fishing regulations. In the 1980s Alaska imposed the charter fleet's first safety-oriented 
guidelines through United States Coast Guard (USCG) certification. In 2005, ADFG 
established a charter-specific license over registration for charter operators. Rigorous 
logbook requirements were not introduced until the early 1990s, with the most recent 
major revision in 2005.2 In the year prior to these most recent changes, charter halibut 
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operators fished under their first Guideline Harvest Level (GHL) as developed at the 
Council. This Council action was the first implemented attempt to mitigate the impact of 
charter landings on the commercial sector. The GHL is a soft cap, which means that 
exceeding the cap does not require immediate management action. 3 If charter landings 
exceed the pre-established GHL, as they have in Southeast Alaska (Area 2C) in 2004 by 
22 percent, and again by 36 percent in 2005,4 then the National Marine Fisheries Service 
notifies the Council and negotiations begin to bring charter halibut landings back within 
the GHL (NMFS 2005a). Current management tools directed at halibut harvest are daily 
bag limits for each recreational license. Other management tools exist, directed at charter 
operators, such as the logbook and licensing requirement. Pre-season estimates in 2005 
predicted that the strictest limits proposed using these tools will still fail to bring charter 
landings within the GHL. Final post-season estimates for 2005, released in late 2006, 
showed an even greater disparity between the GHL and actual landings. 
Most parties involved in charter management see a flaw with this approach, which 
is the delay between the close of a fishing season with an exceeded GHL and the 
consideration and implementation of corrective management measures. For years that 
was as far as consensus reached on the issue. Recently the Council found wide support 
for a moratorium on charter operator entry, revered as a "kumbaia moment" for many 
long-involved in the process. 5 A stakeholder working group, the Charter Committee, 
evaluated different strategies for charter management and presented their findings to the 
Council in 2006. The Halibut Charter Working Group, similarly tasked, offered their 
recommendations to the Council in late 1993. Due to a series of procedural delays and 
possibly some political intervention, the first working group's recommendations were for 
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naught when the 2005 Council rescinded a 2001 Council management plan for the charter 
fleet. Further detail on management development in the charter fishery will come later in 
this paper. 
Work is only recently emerging in the literature that explores the impact of 
expanding recreational fisheries on existing recreational and commercial fisheries. This 
is surprising given the considerable social and economic value which recreational 
fisheries are generally held to provide. Recent research suggests that the impact is 
significant and growing (Kirkegaard and Gartside 1998; Kearney 2001; Garcia-Moliner 
et al. 2002; Coleman et al. 2004). Sometimes the recreational impact exacerbates 
declining stocks in some commercial fisheries. Sometimes stock depletion comes from 
recreational effort alone. Either way, the implication of a growing recreational impact 
means fisheries management must take steps to guide this developing effort (Kearney 
2001). 
Creating suitable alternatives to the current management approach in recreational 
fisheries has so far proved difficult. The reasons are different from those common in 
commercial fisheries. For example, much of recreational management falls victim to 
imprecise descriptions of the fishery (Kearney 2001). Current management strategies do 
not account for fundamental user group differences. Managers must have a very clear 
sense of a fishery's purpose before they can approach that particular fishery's 
management. It is those differences that need attention in order to find the right 
management tools. 
Common approaches used to evaluate commercial fisheries fit recreational 
fisheries poorly (Kirkegaard and Gartside 1998; Garcia-Moliner et al. 2002; Schroeder 
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and Love 2002). Instead, management appears to take a one-size-fits-all approach that 
fails to recognize the unique attributes of individual recreational fisheries. This is 
arguably one of the primary reasons why many conflicts in recreational fisheries 
management remain unsettled. With recreational landings and demand on the rise both in 
Alaska and around the globe, more precise management is needed to address 
conservation and to mitigate social problems (Kirkegaard and Gartside 1998). 
1.1 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The purpose of this paper is threefold. Firstly, it is to determine why a 
management plan for the halibut charter fishery is not yet in place. Secondly, it is to 
identify the features of this management challenge that require new, creative solutions. 
Thirdly, it is to suggest a possible way for management in the charter halibut fishery to 
proceed beyond its current impasse. 
1.2 METHODOLOGY 
Methods for pursuing the above research problem include a review of previous 
studies on the Alaska halibut charter fishery. The review also includes an examination of 
studies related to recreational fisheries management that bear on user group conflicts 
similar to those encountered in the Alaska halibut charter fishery. Following the 
literature review I provide a more detailed discussion of the current conflict in Alaska 
with an overview of the U.S. policy-making process for fisheries. I will then tum to a 
presentation of a new assessment method for recreational fishing effort. The presentation 
will lead to an analysis of management tools that hold promise for Alaska's halibut 
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charter fishery. Research also involves an analysis of pertinent statistics on the Alaska 
halibut fisheries, discussions with individuals involved in the conflict, and relevant 
personal experience from the Alaska fisheries. This process will culminate in a 
connection between the diverse values recreational fishermen bring to a fishery, and the 
way fishermen pursue their respective harvest goals. Through an analysis of recreational 
fishing motivations, I hope to find a more appropriate suite of management tools for the 
halibut charter fishery. The method developed here may prove relevant and useful for the 
management of other recreational fisheries as well. 
There is little published peer-reviewed research on the Alaska halibut charter fleet 
and their interactions with the commercial fishery. In addition, recreational management 
in the Council is in its infancy, so the outcome of this research will depend heavily on an 
ongoing broad dialogue with people from NMFS, IPHC, ADFG, the Council, the charter 
fishery, and both commercial and recreational fishing sectors. I will draw on the work of 
Kearney (200 1) and others whose research is related to this budding area in fisheries 
management. To this end, I will meld published academic work and conversations within 
the Alaska fisheries in the anticipation of producing a proposal of merit. 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES AND DISCUSSION 
Critics of fisheries tend to focus blame on either management of the commercial 
sector or commercial fishermen themselves when a fished species is in decline. Recent 
literature suggests recreational fisheries also play a part (Kearney 2001; Pitcher and 
Hollingworth 2002; Post et al. 2002; Coleman et al. 2004). Frequently expressed in this 
literature is the surprising absence of further published and reviewed sources directly 
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related to marine recreational fisheries issues. Many argue that this is because of "the 
perception that recreational fishing had little influence on stock declines" (1958, Coleman 
et al. 2004; Schroeder and Love 2002). 
Bob Kearney addresses this lack of research repeatedly (Kearney 1994, 2001, 
2002a,b ). He is perhaps the first to ask "why haven't even the most important 
recreational fisheries been extensively studied?" (15, Kearney 1994). Although much of 
the recreational fisheries literature I reference in this paper was published after 1994, 
Kearney's concern for recreational fisheries is still well founded. He lists common 
problems and perceptions in recreational fisheries management: a widespread belief in a 
limitless ocean, commercial fishing's ruthless impact, absent research, and weak, if any, 
monitoring. One of his more telling observations is as follows: "[a]nglers, and angling 
bodies, didn't really want to know what the total catch was, probably because of a 
combination of the perception that 'we couldn't possibly be the problem' and perhaps a 
hidden fear that if the truth came out catches might be restricted" (15, Kearney 1994). 
This is echoed in more recent research (Kirkegaard and Gartside 1998; Schroeder and 
Love 2002). 
Literature m other areas can provide good information for use in manne 
recreational fisheries. Taking a page from inland fisheries management, Wikle (1991) 
discusses several rationing methods and uses an uncommon approach for identifying 
those most suitable for a particular fishery. The methods considered are: price, merit, 
lottery, first-come-first-served, advanced reservation, and priority for first time users. 
Wikle focuses on "public acceptance of alternative rationing policies" because successful 
resource management requires user buy-in (389, Wikle 1991). He suggests that a useful 
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step toward this goal is to ask the public which method is preferred. This is because 
perceptions of management methods can vary greatly between managers and the public. 
This paper's approach is similar, insofar as anticipating recreational fisherman's reasons 
for fishing, and subsequently managing with tools appropriate for those reasons. 
Two of Wikle's suggested tools come into play in this research; advanced 
reservations and lottery distribution. Advanced reservations are a queue-type of 
distribution tool. Similar to a first-come-first-served model, the queue is a method for 
fishermen to confirm their privilege of access to the fishery. Wikle (1991) cites Stankey 
and Badden (1977) for their concerns with advanced reservations. Discrimination against 
users who make "spur-of-the-moment decisions" is unavoidable, meaning that only those 
"who live and work orderly lives" will benefit from advanced reservation methods (390, 
Wikle 1991). For the purposes of this paper, the sort ofpeople who plan their activities 
will be 'Advance Notification' (AN) fishermen, and those who do not plan their fishing 
will be 'No-Advance Notification' (NAN) fishermen. Complications with advanced 
reservations begin with no-shows and people who "strategically make multiple 
reservations" in order to keep their options open (390, Wikle 1991). These Issues 
typically result in underutilization, with the potential for local economies to suffer 
unanticipated losses in-season. The other burdens of advanced reservations are the 
inevitable voluminous paperwork and communication associated with organizing 
reservations to access a given resource (Wikle 1991). Those issues which Wikle (1991) 
cites concerning underutilization are most likely not a factor in the charter fleet (fishing 
trip no-shows and fishermen who make multiple reservations), as long as there is some 
process to redistribute un-harvested halibut in the same season. 
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A member of the most recent Charter Committee, Rex Murphy, put forward a 
proposal for charter halibut management based on advanced reservation. The Murphy 
Proposal (2006) uses halibut tickets to distribute halibut to recreational fishermen. His 
proposal originally avoided splitting allocation between the charter and non-charter 
sectors, instead distributing halibut to the entire recreational halibut fishery with halibut 
tickets. This means that all halibut harvested recreationally in Alaska would require first 
a halibut ticket specific for the landed fish, whether landed from a charter boat or 
privately. The current version of his proposal provides an option for the combination of 
charter and non-charter halibut distribution. In this paper's analysis, I use Murphy's 
proposal as an example of a queue for halibut. I also articulate my own ideas for a lottery 
to distribute halibut. 
A lottery, although far from economically efficient, is the most equitable method 
for distributing a resource (Hardin 1969). Lotteries distribute all rents as user surplus to 
anyone winning the lottery. A lottery also presents a cost and time burden to those 
holding the lottery, both toward collecting applications and notifying users after the 
lottery (Wikle 1991). Thus far, lottery use is more common in land-based recreational 
management, such as federal park access or big-game hunts. Lotteries are rarely used in 
recreational fisheries, probably because of an absent realization that recreational fisheries 
require some sort of limited access management. This warrants further discussion about 
the nature oflottery allocation (Coleman et al. 2004). 
The complexities of fisheries mean that no lottery for a fishery could exist without 
modification. There are many facets to designing a resource lottery, such as transaction 
costs, area exceptions or permissions, etc. Transferability of a won lottery ticket is one of 
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these issues sometimes questioned. Creating a transferable lottery ticket would 
undermine some of the equity found through a random drawing, and it would introduce a 
secondary market for fisheries access counter to the purpose of the lottery. Issuance of a 
lottery ticket to a third party, such as a fishing guide, may work for some fisheries where 
guide use is high. Controls must be in place so that a guide or other third party could not 
unduly profit from offering this ticket to fishermen. 
Kerr (1995, 351) approaches price and lottery allocation with the assumptions that 
transaction costs are zero, there is a fixed overall use allowed, and the 'marginal social 
cost of [the] resource is zero for all use levels." Kerr concludes that since "( 1) price 
allocation always yields greater expected aggregate benefits than lottery allocation; and 
(2) lottery allocation always yields greater expected consumer benefits than price 
allocation ... there will be consumer preference for lottery allocation. This result occurs 
because, while price allocation may be efficient, the efficiency gains will not flow to the 
resource users unless they are also the resource owners." (362, Kerr 1995). 
Koh et al. (2006) provides further support for lottery allocation. Their study 
focuses on the differences between lottery and queue distribution, rather than lottery and 
price as in Kerr (1995). Dependent on the consumer's time spent in a queue, and how 
they value that time, the queue's efficiency will improve as the cost of time in the queue 
increases. This means fewer people will participate because of the high participation 
cost. Barzel (1974) also notes inefficiencies with queues, in that participants with the 
lowest time-value (i.e. easily able to join a queue) may receive less benefit than those 
whose time-costs are higher. These values are unknown much of the time, especially 
when considering benefits other than monetary value. Koh et al. (2006) finds lotteries as 
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both the more efficient and more equitable choice for distribution under many 
circumstances. They go further to propose modifications to a lottery when a queue is 
otherwise the more efficient choice, suggesting that a lottery is the superior allocation 
mechanism through its adaptability and innate equity. The key modification Koh et al. 
propose is to create separate lotteries within a distribution for different user group types. 
Koh et al. suggest dividing a lottery among different incomes, but other demographic 
splits are possible. This could help ease tensions between different user groups seeking a 
share of some pre-determined allocation. 
A modification already common m lotteries is the use of a point system. 
Buschena et al. (200 1) discusses the point system for Elk permits in Colorado. The 
points are awarded to lottery losers from prior years. These points build to give an 
applicant a probabilistic advantage in the following year's draw. Here is an example: 
" ... assume that Sally has five preference points for her first choice of an 
archery only hunt in Colorado's Game Management Unit 10 and that there 
are 20 such tags available. Sally will receive the license with certainty as 
long as there are no more than 20 applicants with five or more preference 
points. Suppose, however, that 15 people have more than five preference 
points and 10 people have five. Those with more than five preference 
points will be guaranteed permits. Sally will enter a random lottery for the 
remaining five permits with the 9 others who also have five preference 
points, and each will have a 0.5 probability of being drawn. Any person 
applying for this permit with more than five points (e.g., Sam with seven 
preference points) will obtain the permit and will surrender all of his 
accumulated preference points" (35, Buschena et al. 2001) 
These systems are in use in hunts elsewhere in the United States, but Alaska has 
consistently turned down proposals for preference points. According to ADFG Deputy 
Director of Wildlife Conservation, the Alaska Board of Fish and Game consistently votes 
against a preference point system because it favors seasoned hunters. In the example 
above, Sally has entered the lottery for five consecutive years and lost every time because 
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she has not acquired enough preference points. Lotteries are desirable because there is no 
guarantee that one entrant will win over another. A preference point system guarantees 
that a new entrant will surely not win the lottery until they have built up the appropriate 
number of preference points to compete with long-time participants. Using the current 
system without preference points, and only a restriction on entry from prior-year lottery 
winners, means that "the 30 year resident has no preference over a new resident."6 
Whatever management plan the Council establishes for the Charter fishery will of 
course impact all recreational halibut fishermen. If the fishermen themselves are not 
considered in a permanent management plan, then they will receive only marginal benefit 
from the fishery. Kearney (2001) provides a list of recreational fishery user types meant 
to satisfy the aim of including recreational fishermen's views. His list goes well with the 
conclusions of Wikle (1991) and Kerr (1995). Defining recreational fishing types on a 
multi-dimensional scale is an important goal for recreational fisheries management. Lists 
of recreational fishing types similar to Kearney's appear in the literature periodically. 
Each time, the particular definition of recreational fishing effort comes under a slightly 
different heading, from relative skill (Oh and Ditton 2006), to anticipations of leisure 
(Holland and Ditton 1992), to technical approaches (Bryan 1977). 
Holland and Ditton ( 1992), and Oh and Ditton (2006) follow a track similar to 
Kearney's (2001) to assess which experiences recreational fishermen value the most. 
Holland and Ditton's (1992) survey group consists of 166 members in a Texas fishing 
club. They find that the reasons why most respondents fish is a complex set of feelings 
toward recreation, and only 6 percent are primarily focused on catching fish. Holland 
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and Ditton's survey is limited to one region, but applying their approach to the charter 
fishery would benefit ongoing management development. 
Oh and Ditton (2006) also assess recreational fishermen by their experiences, but 
they focus on the specialization level of recreational fishermen. Their mail survey of 
1,377 fishermen in Texas (with 791 responses) did find a positive trend between fishing 
specialization and the fisherman's interest in more restrictive management practices. The 
more casual the fisherman, the more interested he is in relaxed bag limits and lesser 
limitations on his fishing. In general, Oh and Ditton determine that skilled fishermen are 
more interested in the fishing experience than in the pursuit of higher catch rates. This 
seems to fit broader assumptions about fishing skill level, such that as fishing skill 
increases, the desire for high volume landings decreases. In lieu of high landings, skilled 
fishermen have a desire to pursue more challenging methods of capture (i.e., switching 
from spinning gear to fly gear), and seek more unique experiences from their fishing 
trips. Although charter fishermen are limited to two halibut per day and four in 
possession, there is no annual limit to their harvests. Landings beyond the possession 
limit are possible and common in the halibut fisheries. 
Bryan (1977) is the earliest source I find which evaluates recreational fishermen 
types. He segments fishermen in Wyoming into four groups: technique-setting specialists 
(professionals), technique specialists (avid fishermen), generalists (weekend warriors), 
and occasional anglers. It is apparent from the work ofBryan (1977), Holland and Ditton 
(1992), Kearney (2001), and Oh and Ditton (2006), that no particular assessment 
technique is standard for evaluating recreational fisheries. As such, the use of such 
assessments for management is casual and applied only in a modest sense through 
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discussion with no formal assessment. Without the appropriate access to evaluation 
procedures at this time, I will use Kearney's (2001) list among those available for the 
charter fishery, and I encourage a more thorough study at the governmental level in 
Alaska. The list itself and my interpretation are discussed in a subsequent section. 
Studies specific to charter fishing in the United States are beginning to appear in 
the literature. Holland (1998) follows up on earlier research (Ditton et al. 1988; Holland 
and Milon 1989) and begins describing the breadth of charter fisheries in the Gulf of 
Mexico. Holland found existing charter fishing effort for 23 different species in the Gulf 
of Mexico charter fisheries, and noted uncertainty toward Mexican charter fisheries and 
their impact on Gulf of Mexico fish stocks. Steinback ( 1999) applies the Impact Analysis 
for Planning (IMPLAN) system to the Maine charter fisheries. IMPLAN is a tool which 
contributes to regional Economic Impact Assessments (EIA), an approach used in the 
U.S. fisheries policy process. Steinback's work is foundational for jumpstarting a 
dependable method for conducting EIAs in other states. However, IMPLAN requires 
extensive knowledge of a fishery's demographics. Such information is not available for 
most recreational fisheries. 
Van Voorhees et al. (2002) conducts a pilot study of how the government collects 
information on Gulf of Mexico charter boat effort. They find that asking charter boat 
operators about client landings provides a more accurate cross-section of the fleet's 
harvest than surveying the fishermen themselves. This is a situational experience, since 
the charter operator logbook program in Alaska in the late 1990s showed a greater 
variation from actual landings than when ADFG surveyed fishermen. Garcia-Moliner et 
al. (2002) presented findings on general charter activity in the U.S. Caribbean, including 
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Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands. They note an absence of continued 
charter fishery management and observation in that region, despite the region's 50 year 
history of charter fishing. Due to this lack of observation, their study works to establish 
some baseline for future management by assessing the types of charter activity present, 
the species targeted, and typical areas fished. They provide some helpful commentary on 
the need to establish more oversight in the region's expanding charter sector. Grado et al. 
(2003) perform an economic analysis of charter businesses in the Mississippi Gulf Coast 
for 2001. Similar to the efforts of Garcia-Moliner et al. (2002), Grado et al. work to 
establish baselines for future management and economic trends in the charter sector. The 
research described above is foundational to a growing body of literature on charter 
fisheries. However, they are not directly related to the issue at hand and will therefore 
not be discussed further here. 
There are few papers outside of government documents directly related to the 
Alaska halibut charter fishery. The earliest of these is the NMFS commissioned report by 
Wilen and Brown (2000). Wilen and Brown examine quota transfer options for the 
proposed 2001 charter halibut quota system. They approach a series of transferability 
options by discussing major efficiency and distributive issues within those options, 
outlining possible outcomes for no-lease and leasable quotas, and other proposed 
controls. They favor unencumbered leasing, and at one point argue that the restricted 
quota blocks in the commercial quota system are so inefficient that they miss a potential 
$55 million in additional revenue. The discussion is presented with economic efficiency 
as the primary goal in this management plan, with negativity expressed toward tools 
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which limit otherwise uninhibited trade between or within the sectors (Wilen and Brown 
2000). 
In Wilen's (2001) assessment for the Council, he provides further information on 
the potential impact of a charter quota system. Exploring price differences between a 
quota system, open-access, and the Guideline Harvest Level (GHL) plan, Wilen draws 
two important conclusions concerning quota systems. One, that recreational supply and 
demand will determine quota price (rather than the other way around, a common 
assumption), and two, that trip costs will likely decline in the long run with more efficient 
business practices. Wilen notes that both quantifying and finding qualitative opinions on 
what will happen in the long run for the charter halibut fishery is difficult. Both of 
Wilen's papers were applicable when a quota program was a viable option for the charter 
fishery, but Wilen will contribute little to the evaluation of a queue or lottery process 
described later in this paper. 
Other work published after the 2001 Council decision to implement a charter 
halibut quota program (NPFMC 200la), but before the quota program was rescinded in 
Council (NPFMC 2005a), is Criddle et al. (2003) and Criddle (2004). Criddle et al. 
explores changes in angler welfare using a number of different variables, from trip costs 
to anticipated landings. Their focus is pacific halibut, and their base for the study is a 
large section of Area 3A called Cook Inlet. Cook Inlet is a large protrusion into central 
Alaska, linking Anchorage to the Pacific Ocean. The area is a popular destination for 
charter fishing, where inland residents can easily charter a boat instead of concerning 
themselves with the work of maintaining their own vessel, and where out-of-state 
fishermen can access both the amenities in Anchorage and find a suitable Alaskan fishing 
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expenence. Criddle et al. (2003) find that increases in a fisherman's expected halibut 
catch will provide clear increases in angler-days fished, and that increasing trip costs 
(whether through abundance changes, management restraints, etc.) will cause a decrease 
in angler-days fished. This exploratory study provides a good background for the halibut 
fishery. 
Criddle (2004) steps away from isolated sportfishing impacts and instead assesses 
changes to a fishery when multiple user types compete for a single species. Criddle 
applies a series of models to the pacific halibut fishery in an attempt to account for sport, 
consumer, and commercial use. He finds that there is more than one optimal situation 
depending on the allocation structure. Equally important, Criddle finds that the various 
optimal situations are "inferior to all other solutions from the perspective of at least one 
of the three stakeholder groups" (162, Criddle 2004). Criddle describes six different 
management objectives: Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), maximum net revenue for 
commercial users, maximum net benefit for consumers, maximum net benefits for both 
consumers and commercial users, maximum net benefits for the sport sector, and 
maximum net benefits for all three sectors. Criddle's model is very informative 
regarding the possible management options for multi-user fisheries. His final 
recommendations coincide with those of prior studies. Criddle is a proponent of rights-
based management and finds that a charter halibut quota system, among other benefits, 
has "the potential to reduce allocation battles between the commercial fishery and the 
largest segment of the sport fishery" (165, Criddle 2004). The IFQ system, although 
rescinded in 2005, is still a potential option as the Council continues its deliberations on 
future charter management (NPFMC 2005a). 
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The above studies supplement the wide body of government documents from the 
Council, NMFS, and ADFG. The most detailed work on halibut comes in the form of 
Council assessment documents, written whenever a Council action would significantly 
impact how a fishery operates. These documents make up a combined Environmental 
Assessment/Regional Impact Review/Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis 
(EAIRIR/IRF A). This paper references two, one from just prior to Council approval of a 
quota system for the charter fleet in 2001, and another from early 2006, when the Council 
considered lowering individual bag limits to bring the charter halibut harvest back within 
the GHL. Combining the myriad discussion papers, committee letters, and other 
documents associated with the Council process, we can follow the structured evolution of 
U.S. fisheries management. In addition to the EAIRIR/IRF A documents I use meeting 
minutes, which include testimony from the United States Coast Guard's stance on safety 
in the charter fleet (NPFMC 2005a). Other documents essential to this research are some 
of those produced by the current Charter Committee. Different proposals, such as the 
Murphy proposal introduced earlier, come to the Committee from members and other 
stakeholders. Each expresses another potential remedy for charter fishery management. 
Most information on charter fishery demographics I obtain through personal 
communications with various stakeholders, since formal studies are few. So far, only one 
such study proves useful. McDowell (2005) performed a detailed analysis of charter 
effort in Sitka, Alaska in 2005. Based on airport surveys of recreational fishermen 
departing Sitka, the McDowell Group assembled a cross-section of the fishing effort 
types common to charter fishing in that area. This might appear as a biased sample, but 
Sitka is a remote location and is only accessible by sea or air. Although I have no hard 
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data on transportation choices for charter fishermen in Sitka, the cost and time it takes to 
travel by ferry versus by plane is great. It is safe to assume that the bulk of charter 
fishermen travel to and from Sitka by air. This study is likely applicable also to much of 
Southeast Alaska. Demographics of other areas along the Alaska coast on charter fishing 
effort would be very useful, but at the time of writing I am unaware of any other studies 
on this topic. 
3. ALASKA HALIBUT CHARTER MANAGEMENT 
The Alaska charter halibut fishery is one of the most popular recreational fisheries 
in Alaska (Criddle 2004). This popularity initially grew without much state attention to 
charter operator qualifications or management of the charter fishery. As stated earlier, 
the charter fleet "operated in a vacuum"7 through the 1970s. The Halibut charter fleet 
operated under open-access conditions for decades, which theoretically ended with 
Council involvement and the implementation of the GHL. Charter harvests in Areas 3A 
and 2C have shown marked increases since 2002, but overall recreational halibut harvests 
in Southeast and Southcentral Alaska have been growing since at least 1977 when ADFG 
began its annual mail surveys (Figures 2 and 3; Meyer and Stock 2002; White and 
Jaenicke 2003, ADFG 2006d). Although information on overall recreational harvests 
dates to 1977, ADFG data specifying landings from either charter or non-charter effort 
begins in 1986. Figure 2, below, shows this general upward trend in halibut landings for 
Southcentral Alaska (Area 3A) only, but is representative of the landings trend in 
Southeast Alaska (Area 2C) as well. Halibut harvest data for 2C before 1996 was not 
available. In addition, information up to 1995 for Area 3A is only available in numbers 
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of halibut. Figure 3 shows the most precise information available on overall halibut 
landings, including average weights by Area for both 2C and 3A. 
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(Meyer and Stock 2002; Meyer 2003; ADFG 2006b,d. 2006 figures are preliminary. 
Author's Compilation). 
Halibut assessment for both Canada and the United States is conducted through 
the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) as dictated by the Halibut Act, 
mentioned earlier. The fishery CEY determined at IPHC is a biological mark, no more 
than a recommendation and not a dedicated allocation to the commercial fleet. 
Acceptance of IPHC recommendations and commercial allocation is conducted at the 
federal level. After determining the various halibut stocks' estimated exploitable 
biomasses, the IPHC removes all non-commercial uses (such as subsistence, recreational, 
bycatch, and others) to determine a final allocation for the commercial fishery. The 
IPHC includes an element for consideration of market conditions prior to a final fishery 
CEY determination. Through this process, the percentage of commercial quota declined 
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in an 'open-ended reallocation' to the charter fleet. 'Open-ended' means that the charter 
fleet effectively grew without an allocation restraint, the only limit being the number of 
fish a charter fisherman could catch and the number of fishermen a charter operator could 
carry m a season. The commercial fleet subsequently brought this concern to the 
Council's attention in 1993, after which the Council created the Halibut Charter Working 
Group (HCWG) to consider the dilemma. 
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The HCWG presented its findings to Council later in 1993, beginning a long and 
yet incomplete process to bring long-term management to the charter halibut fishery. 
Section 3 below will provide more detail on this management development. In December 
2005 the Council passed an ADFG motion to rescind the Halibut Charter Individual 
Fisheries Quota (IFQ) program, a program rooted in the HCWG (NPFMC 2001a, 
2005a,b; NMFS 2005a). This action reverses twelve years of industry-supported 
debate, 10 including "over 8,000 public comments on managing the charter halibut 
fishery" (4, NPFMC 2001a). It should be noted at this point that at no time in the charter 
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halibut IFQ program's development did ADFG ever support the program. 11 The Council 
appointed another workgroup, the Charter Halibut Stakeholder Committee, to review 
charter halibut management. This committee developed alternatives, including the 
recently rescinded IFQ option, and presented them to the Council in December 2006. 
Council action has now been delayed to 2008 pending further review of the proposed 
alternatives, discussed below. After the Council takes final action on their preferred 
alternative, Council staff will complete an EAIRIR/IRF A and forward the management 
action to NMFS for further review and publication in the Federal Register. Publication of 
the final rule may take up to a year after the Council's final action. The following is a 
discussion of the U.S. policy-making process regarding the development of charter 
management. 
3.1 POLICY-MAKING AND CHARTER MANAGEMENT 
Developing management plans or actions within the United States fishery 
management system follows three steps. The process begins with public concern 
proposed in Council on a given issue. The second step is Council review and 
development of management options or alternatives. The third step is a federal review 
within NMFS of proposed Council actions, with any final adjustments to a plan or action 
made after federal review (NMFS 2004). 
Council meetings are held five times annually. Members of the public usually 
propose an issue to the Council during the regular public comment period at every 
meeting, but Council members may also present proposals for consideration. The 
Council will rank the various proposals, addressing the most critical first. The Council's 
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standing industry Advisory Panel (AP) takes the proposals and identifies a set of 
alternatives for the proposals they feel are most urgent. After receiving public testimony 
and the AP's recommendations, the Council will develop formal problem statements for 
those proposals warranting further investigation. Sensitive issues will go to an ad-hoc 
stakeholder committee, such as the recent Charter Halibut Stakeholder Committee. 
Council members or others interested in a proposal may also prepare statements for 
presentation. In addition, the Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) will address the 
biological and ecological elements of an issue. This accumulation of research is 
presented at a subsequent Council meeting, where either the Council will request more 
research and recommendations on the issue, or they will select which alternatives their 
staff will prepare for a formal vote at a later meeting (NMFS 2004). 
At this point the Council staff will work with ADFG and NMFS to clarify that all 
alternatives follow the necessary regulations. The Council aims for a six-month window 
between the October and April meetings to prepare most analyses, issues of greater 
complexity can take much longer and may require more complex documentation (NMFS 
2004). AP, SSC, and public commentary on draft analyses documents are also accepted 
during this process. Once a review is complete, the Council will hear again the proposed 
alternatives and vote on which one the Council will submit for NMFS review. 12 The 
Preferred Alternative then follows a detailed review at the NMFS Regional office prior to 
official Council submission to the Secretary of Commerce. Figure 4 displays the 
Council's consideration process for management actions. 
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Fig. 4. Council Process for Consideration of Management Actions. 
Once at the regional office, a Preferred Alternative follows a 12-step revtew. 
NMFS maintains offices in each of the eight management regions, with North Pacific 
region offices in Juneau, Alaska. The following description is for their office 
specifically, but the process is similar at other regional offices. This NMFS regional 
review is one of two federal reviews, and is the most thorough. Secretarial review is 
frequently a matter of the regional office notifying their respective counterparts in 
Maryland at NMFS headquarters of an action in process. 
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There are five primary divisions in the Juneau NMFS office. Those five divisions 
are Sustainable Fisheries, Protected Resources, Habitat Conservation, Enforcement, and 
Operations, Management, and Information. Additional offices are Restricted Access 
Management and an administrative section. These offices work in consort with the 
Council to both develop the proper documentation for Secretarial Review and to revise 
technical implementation plans, cost projections, and other operating issues which are 
part of an action. The review is a formal NMFS process, but it is not the Secretarial 
review (Jay Ginter, Personal Communication, 7 May 2007). Figure 5 displays the 
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reviewing schedule at the regional office, each box representing a different office and 
review. 
After these twelve clearance points at the regional office, an action is returned to 
the Council for official submission to the Secretary of Commerce. If a Council action 
fails to meet regulatory standards at the regional level, then the action is returned to 
Council with an explanation. The regional office review could take as little as one week, 
but depending on the action's complexity it may take longer. Generally, if the action 
requires complex analysis, getting to the proposed rule stage may take six months or 
more. Publishing a proposed and final rule after analysis usually takes two to six months. 
Issues that may lengthen the time required for analysis publication include Secretarial 
review, the summer fishing season (three to six months), regional completion of a 
complex analysis, or other pending Council actions. If the regional office finds itself 
over-tasked, then completing management action reviews could take much longer. 13 
Once an action is officially submitted to the Secretary, it runs through a final five 
checkpoints. At this juncture, the bulk of an action's revision should be complete. 
Although a second full review is permitted at the Secretarial level, frequently a brief 
summary of the action and modifications from the NMFS Regional office is all the 
reviewers require. If an action does not pass Secretarial review, it is returned to Council 
with an explanation. The final review process for a Council action is below (Figure 6). 
Secretarial review is clearly less regionally-specific, and the review does not 
include offices such as Enforcement or Restricted Access Management. The overall 
federal review process is designed so that the regional office review assumes the brunt of 
the labor in action review, since Secretarial intervention will waylay progress for months 
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or years, as is the case with charter halibut fishery management. In process order, the 
offices at NMFS which conduct the final review are the Office of Sustainable Fisheries, 
NOAA General Counsel, the Department of Commerce Office of General Counsel, and 
Office of Management and Business. Lastly, an action goes to the NMFS Director's 
office. He will sign an action on behalf of the Secretary of Commerce. Only then is an 
action published in the Federal Register as a proposed rule. 14 
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Fig. 6. Secretarial Review Process for Submitted Council Actions. 
Once published, a proposed rule is open for public comment. The timeline for 
this process is well-prescribed, and is dependant on the type of Council action. Halibut 
fisheries do not have an MSA-required Fishery Management Plan (FMP). Instead, the 
Halibut Act and IPHC serve in place of a FMP. Therefore, no FMP amendments will 
ever come from Council for the halibut fisheries, only Regulatory Amendments (Jay 
Ginter, Personal Communication, 7 May 2007). The timeline for public review in this 
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case is as follows. Once received, Secretarial review must begin within five days. The 
review itself is the only portion of this process not regulated by a time limit. If the action 
fails approval, then it is returned to Council with an explanation. If approved, the 
Secretary must publish the rule in the Federal Register within two weeks. A proposed 
Regulatory Amendment is available for public comment for thirty days. Once the 
comment period is complete, NMFS has another thirty days to synthesize and respond to 
public comments in the Final Rule, making any necessary changes as well. An action is 
in effect thirty days after final publication (NMFS 2004). 
3.1.1 Regional Review- A Historical Perspective 
Commercial halibut fishermen approached the Council in 1993. Their concern 
was that, under IPHC allocation methods, the commercial fishery was losing halibut to 
the charter fishery. As introduced earlier, the Council established the HCWG to consider 
management possibilities for this open-ended reallocation from the commercial to the 
charter sector. The Council had to postpone consideration of the HCWG findings due to 
staffing priorities. In early 1995 the Council followed through on the Work Group's 
1993 presentation, discussing alternative management measures against the status quo. 
Still plagued with staffing issues, and an additional lack of funding for proper 
management analysis, Council movement on charter management was delayed for 
another year (71 Fed. Reg. 26). The timeline in Figure 7 should help visualize the charter 
fleet's complex management history. 
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Four years after the Council's initial problem statement on halibut charter 
management, the 1997 Council approved Guideline Harvest Levels (GHL) for the charter 
fleet in Areas 2C and 3A. Their action allocated 125 percent of the charter fleet's 
average 1995 to 1999 harvests to the GHL, the extra 25 percent to allow for modest 
growth. The Council intended the GHL to act as a stop-gap and to provide enough time 
to for the Council to develop a permanent solution. The GHL amounted to 13.05 percent 
(1.432 million lbs) of the shared commercial/charter quota in 2C and 14.11 percent (3.65 
million lbs) in 3A (68 Fed. Reg. 153). The stated intent for the GHL structure was "to 
maintain a stable charter season of historic length, using area-specific measures" (v, 
NPFMC 2001b). If landings data indicated the charter fleet had exceeded the GHL, data 
which is available about a year later, then a review of current management measures 
would begin. This process results in a minimum two-year delay between the initial GHL 
overage and management action (68 Fed. Reg. 153). The council initially approved no 
specific management measures in 1997 that would respond to a GHL overage. Without 
management measures, the GHL did not require secretarial review or publication in the 
Federal Register. The Council additionally approved new recordkeeping requirements 
for the charter fleet with a detailed logbook program (NPFMC 2006a). 
Shortly after, the Council decided to address management structure and possible 
responses under the GHL (NPFMC 2001b). Closing the charter fishery mid-season was 
and is not considered an option; that action is counter to maintaining a "charter season of 
historic length" (3, NPFMC 2001b). In 2000 the Council approved and submitted a 
detailed framework of harvest reduction measures. These measures were in line with the 
historic season requirements for the charter fleet, and they would more rapidly establish 
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GHL restrictions based on the exceeded percentage of the GHL. After a lengthy federal 
review, NMFS published the GHL in the Federal Register in 2002 for final comments (67 
Fed. Reg. 18). 
Building on the GHL, the Council approved an IFQ program for the charter fleet 
in 2001 (NPFMC, 2001b). However, ADFG challenged the Council's use of charter 
logbooks as an IFQ allocation data source. ADFG argued that initial mis-reporting and 
otherwise generally flawed accounting in the logbooks meant the logbooks were 
unreliable and thus inappropriate as a reference for allocation, and ADFG suspended the 
logbook program in 2001 due to these errors (ADFG 2001). The Council's Scientific and 
Statistical Committee (SSC) reviewed this issue and suggested to the Council that, 
although the logbooks were not the best absolute measure of charter landings, upon state 
revision and correction the logbooks were an adequate tool for IFQ allocation (SSC 
2000). Under modified assessments, the Council re-approved the IFQ program in 2001 
and submitted it for federal review (NPFMC 2001c). 
3.1.2 Federal Review- A Historical Perspective 
After Council approval, both the GHL and IFQ experienced further procedural 
delays while under federal review (71 Fed. Reg. 26). Although delays are not unusual 
with new quota programs, these delays can be detrimental to successful limited entry 
establishment (McCay et al. 1995; Pautzke and Oliver 1997). The GHL's delay began 
with a NMFS letter to the Council on 2 April, 2002. "The current framework cannot be 
implemented as conceived by the Council because the Administrative Procedure Act 
(AP A) requires that any regulatory action have prior notice and opportunity for public 
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comment before becoming effective" (47258, 68 Fed. Reg. 153). 15 According to reasons 
published in the Federal Register, "NMFS could not conclude in advance that a "good 
cause" finding would exist in every instance the GHL was exceeded and harvest 
restrictions triggered" (47258, 68 Fed. Reg. 153). NMFS's letter reversed the GHL 
framework measures, stripping the GHL of any effective management ability. Any 
management action in response to GHL overages now requires a lengthy process of 
public comment, Council deliberation, and federal approval. 
The Council viewed implementing an IFQ program as a multi-step process, with 
the GHL as a necessary first step. Development in the late 1990s continued on the GHL, 
putting the IFQ program on hold. Only after the Council approved the GHL in 2000, did 
they begin an analysis to combine charter and commercial halibut fisheries under one 
IFQ program (71 Fed. Reg. 26). The following year, the Council approved an IFQ 
program for the charter fleet. One Council member moved to repeal the IFQ program at 
the April meeting, shortly after a Council vote approved the IFQ program. The rest of the 
Council then reconfirmed its approval for the program. Again in October that year, the 
Council defeated another motion to rescind the IFQ program (NPFMC 2001a,c). From 
here the IFQ program went to federal review, where it remained until 2005. While 
awaiting review, ADFG and the Council modified the logbook program and implemented 
a revised version of it in 2005. 16 Again it was a staffing shortage, this time at the Alaska 
Region office of NMFS, and Council priorities for NMFS staff in charge of Council 
action review, which caused the IFQ program approval to drag out for another four 
years. 17 The Alaska Region office sent the proposed regulations to the Office of 
Sustainable Fisheries on 20 July 2005. 18 The following month, the NMFS Director sent a 
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letter to the Council requesting a reconfirmation of Council support for the charter IFQ. 
It stated that, 
"these regulations were developed under section 5 of the Northern Pacific 
Halibut Act, 16 U.S.C. 773c(c), which provides that such regulations may 
only be implemented with the approval of the Secretary. Because of the 
passage of time and changed conditions in the fishery since the Council 
took final action on this item, and the controversy surrounding the 
proposed charter vessel IFQ program, I request that the Council confirm 
its support for the proposed program ... "(NMFS 2005b) 
In light of this request ADFG put forward a motion to rescind the IFQ program, 
the third in the IFQ program's history, bringing the process back to the Council for 
further consideration in December 2005. The motion was approved by a different 
Council than the one in place at the time of original approval. This action, on an issue 
already considered settled years prior, 19 is without precedent in the U.S. fisheries Council 
process (NPFMC 2005a; Ward 2005). The Council then created another working group 
to assess alternative management measures, called the Charter Halibut Stakeholder 
Committee. This committee presented their findings, discussed in section 4.3.4, in 
December 2006. 
During these lengthy delays the charter fleet continued to expand, creating a 
significant number of charter businesses ineligible for quota under the Council approved 
IFQ structure (ADFG 2005a). Rapid establishment of a quota program is essential to 
stem this extra build-up of effort between IFQ approval and implementation (Pautzke and 
Oliver 1997). The share of charter businesses ineligible for quota in 2004 was 
substantial. In total, considering statistics for 2004 (Figure 8), only 59.73 percent of 
charter businesses in 2C and 60 percent in 3A were eligible under the 2001 Council 
approved IFQ plan (ADFG 2005a). 
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Fig. 8. Total and Eligible Charter Businesses in 2004 (ADFG 2005a). 
If the IFQ had been approved as submitted to the Secretary, the charter fleet 
would see a dramatic drop in charter businesses as the ineligible businesses folded. This 
sort of displacement is politically unacceptable, as these new interests have developed 
significant sway with the help of former Council member Bob Penny and the independent 
Alaska Charter Association (ACA).20 
Landings data from the 2004 charter season show that the charter fleet in 2C 
exceeded their GHL by 22 percent (NPFMC 2006a). The NPFMC staff completed a 
draft EAIRIR/IRF A for the GHL committee and the Council in February 2006. The 
earliest implementation date for any changes in the charter GHL management plan will 
occur no earlier than 2007 (NPFMC 2006a). At present, the Council has preliminarily 
approved a moratorium on entry to the charter fleet to control halibut harvest. 
The Council is using traditional trip and catch limitations per recreational charter 
license as a means to reduce effort. With the most conservative restriction currently 
listed as an option in the 2006 EAIRIR/IRF A, a limit of 5 halibut annually, the Council 
still expects landings to exceed the GHL for 2006 (NPFMC 2006a). The recreational 
halibut harvest limits in Alaska are two fish per day and a maximum of four fish in 
possession at any time. Because of the apparent failure of current management to bring 
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charter harvests back within the GHL, the IPHC reluctantly recommended the daily bag 
limit for charter fishermen in Areas 2C and 3A be one fish per day at peak fishing times 
(IPHC 2007). This recommendation was not accepted by the Secretaries of State or 
Commerce. (U.S. Department of State 2007). According to data released in late 
September and October 2006, the 2005 and 2006 seasons showed continued disparity 
between the GHL and landings for both 2C and 3A (Figures 9 and 1 0). If bag limit 
restrictions remain the primary control technique for halibut landings in the charter fleet, 
then those bag limits will dwindle to zero with continued charter fishery growth. 
Although charter clients harvest other species (salmon and rockfish) during their charter 
trip, many clients expect halibut landings as part of their fishing experience.21 Removing 
halibut from the client's overall fishing experience will be detrimental to many charter 
businesses. Low halibut bag limits imposed across the entire charter fleet could even 
encourage an effort shift to the non-guided sector, which means recreational fishermen 
fishing for halibut will fish from unguided, unregulated, and relatively unsafe boats when 
compared to any charter vessel. 22 
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4. ANALYSIS 
Recreational fishery landings are generally quite small when compared to 
landings in commercial fisheries. The crux is that, although small in comparison, 
recreational landings are not inconsequential (Coleman et al. 2004). The previous 
discusses the impact that one portion of one recreational fishery can have on a 
commercial fishery for the same species. At the Council level this management is 
evolving with difficulty, largely due to vagaries about what kind of fishing effort the 
Council is attempting to guide. Building on the work of Kearney (2001) and Murphy 
(2006), I present a 'hybrid approach' for charter halibut management, aimed primarily at 
fishermen with allowances for charter operators. It combines the existing recreational 
permit and bag limit structure with a form of equitable distribution using a lottery for 
halibut. 
4.1 KEARNEY'S TAXONOMY 
Kearney (1994) discussed the absence of basic information on recreational 
fisheries that managers need in order to begin assessing recreational fisheries. He asked 
who will be affected by absent research on recreational fisheries (Kearney 1994). Most 
observers would answer quite simply 'recreational fishermen,' or at least fishermen who 
are not fishing commercially. To identify these fishermen more clearly for management 
purposes, Kearney classified recreational effort into eleven different non-commercial 
fishing subgroups. Kearney's list is preliminary; in-depth study of each category does 
not yet exist. Still, his list is a start to clarifying the various types of effort under the 
46 
recreational umbrella. Once the type of effort is clear, it should clarify which pre-
existing tools fit best that particular type of effort. Kearney's (200 1) groups are: 
1. Licensed Commercial Fishers; 
2. Unlicensed Operators who sell their catch; 
3. Accumulators, who use large catches as food for extended groups or for barter; 
4. Competitors, including those to whom the capture of more fish than others is 
pnmary; 
5. Hunters, motivated by the chase and the kill; 
6. Sportspersons, to whom the challenge, the skill, the odds, the adrenalin rush and 
the satisfaction of a job well done are important, but so is a feed of fish; 
7. Recreational Enthusiasts, to whom the outing is most important but for whom a 
feed of fish is still a prize; 
8. Social Fishers, to whom the camaraderie and fellowship are most important; 
9. Adventurers, who like the hunter savour the chase, but not the kill, and release 
their catch; 
10. Lovers of Open Space, who if they do have a line in the water, do so purely to 
justify being outdoors; 
11. Observers, particularly underwater enthusiasts; 
12. Preservationists, who are there to prevent ecosystem change. 
Excluded from recreational fisheries are those groups who sell their catch 
commercially, transfer their catch to others in trade, or who intend to catch no fish. This 
excludes traditional definitions of commercial fishermen, unlicensed fishermen selling 
their catch, accumulators, observers, and preservationists. These twelve groups work 
within roughly four basic fishery outputs: Harvest, trophy, catch and release, and no-
catch. Harvests for this purpose are defined as any amount of catch which other 
fishermen might consider either large or beyond the immediate use of one person. A 
trophy fishery generates a lesser take than that of a harvest fishery per individual 
fisherman, but trophy fisheries frequently target the largest (and most fecund) fish. No 
fish are kept in catch and release, although there is a limited mortality through fish 
hooked, exhausted, and/or improperly released. There is also a limited mortality, a 
'taking,' with no-catch type fisheries. We cannot assume that because a person is not 
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there to kill a fish, his or her presence will not create some mortality through excessive 
harassment or some secondary interaction. A strict definition of a taking is provided by 
the U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973 (2006). It lists a take as any action meant to 
"harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 
engage in any such conduct" (16 USC 1532(3): 18). All of these definitions, the inputs, 
outputs, and links among are ripe for critique and discussion, which I provide below. 
4.2 MURPHY PROPOSAL 
The Charter Committee received the Murphy Proposal in 2006. Murphy's 
Proposal is based on a queue system and distributes halibut to recreational fishermen 
using purchased tickets or stamps. His proposal is a list of provisions for establishing a 
queue. Under each provision, Murphy details a number of options for how to implement 
the provision. There are 7 provisions in the proposal, and they are: 
1. Halibut Harvest Tickets, 
2. Harvest Record, 
3. Halibut Management Database/User Interface, 
4. Entry model, 
5. Enforcement, 
6. Allocation: in effect and separate for Areas 2C and 3A, 
7. User Fee Fund/Allocation growth. 
Murphy's ticket provision offers distribution methods which vary from favoring 
those able to plan well in advance, to staggered availability from one day to an annual 
ticket (including an associated daily bag limit). His proposal dictates that halibut tickets 
be non-transferable and refundable if un-used. Once all halibut tickets are distributed, 
Murphy offers three options: continue or close entry to the fishery; cease ticket sales, or 
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lease or buy quota from the commercial sector. Of the latter two options, quota is 
purchased through a system of user fees available for that purpose. 
Once used, each halibut ticket then becomes a harvest record, including fish 
statistics and catch site. There are several options for handling the completed tags, 
including no collection/voluntary submission of tags, mail-in reporting, online-reporting, 
dockside drop-boxes, and active dockside scanning and collection of tags. 
To manage these tags, Murphy suggests an electronic database. This database is 
used for issuing halibut tickets, recording harvest information, and maintaining a publicly 
accessible ticket count as tickets are reported by one of the methods listed above. 
Murphy assigns no specific body to maintain this database, but ADFG is the most likely 
candidate. It is the only management body that works regularly within the recreational 
fisheries; NMFS and the Council are arms-length. 
Murphy provides three options for entry of new charter businesses to the fishery. 
One is an open entry model, where the number of charter businesses is market-driven. 
The second is a limited entry model, made so by a moratorium on entry, and the final 
model is a combination, allowing open entry in areas with an underdeveloped fishery, 
and limited entry in other areas. Enforcement is a matter of fishery officers checking 
fishermen for valid licenses and properly dated harvest tickets. 
To allocate halibut Murphy proposes two options, both of which split allocation 
between Areas 2C and 3A. The first option allocates halibut to both charter and non-
charter sectors. All halibut fishermen with recreational halibut licenses require halibut 
tickets, with identical restrictions for both sectors. The second option allocates halibut 
tickets to the charter sector only, leaving the non-charter sector untouched. 
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Murphy's final provision is a user fee fund. This fund facilitates growth in the 
charter halibut fishery. Ticket fees, grants to the fishery, and other investments 
contribute to quota purchase for unhindered access by new entrants to the fishery if the 
charter fishery meets its annual allocation mid-season. Currently fee collection is only 
permitted for administrative purposes, not for direct enhancement of the fishery itself 
(Murphy 2006). An element recently brought to the Charter committee is a form of catch 
sharing between the charter and commercial sectors, where in-season commercial quota 
leasing could prevent the need to increase ticket sales specifically, providing charter 
businesses the ability to continue operations. Charter fishery user fees would help fund 
this process. 25 
4.3 A HYBRID APPROACH 
Building on Kearney's (2001) taxonomy and Murphy's (2006) focus on an 
equitable distribution method, I propose a hybrid approach to charter halibut 
management. This approach combines tools already in use in natural resource 
management, but not so far in fisheries. Working under an existing GHL or other 
annually determined charter allocation of halibut, the hybrid approach I propose includes 
both a modified recreational halibut permit and lottery-style distribution. First I will 
consider Kearney (2001) and Murphy (2006); modifying some of their concepts to suit 
the aims of a hybrid plan. I then discuss the hybrid plan itself. 
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4.3.1 Kearney Discussion 
According to Kearney, "regarding fishing as a recreational rather than food-
gathering activity is largely a developed country perspective" (20, Kearney 2002b ). 
Kearney argues that many developing countries do not collect data on recreational 
fisheries, because these countries find that recreational fisheries are too insignificant to 
warrant policy attention. I take another message from the statement above. It is 
Kearney's assumption that a recreational fishery is explicitly not a food-gathering 
activity, but rather is performed with the fishing experience (and enjoyment in catching 
and eating a small amount of fish) paramount. His list of fishing inputs reflects this idea. 
Large amounts of fish are not typically harvested recreationally by individual fisherman. 
If they are, it is only through competition among fishermen, or for accumulation of fish 
for trade. Trade is itself not part of a U.S. recreational fishery, since fish landed under 
recreational auspices are legal only for personal use. What is missing is a recreational 
fishing effort classification where the main purpose is to accumulate food stores beyond a 
single meal for the fisherman and his or her immediate family. This is what may be 
called a 'food-fishery.' Although it may not fit what people commonly consider 
recreation, it is still an activity pursued under recreational licensing in the United States. 
People participating for this reason are what I will call 'stockpilers.' This user type 
agrees with the frequent description of the halibut fishery as a 'meat fishery. ' 26 Adding 
stockpilers to Kearney's (200 1) list the visual relation of recreational fishing inputs and 
outputs in the Alaska halibut charter fishery may be described as follows (Figure 11 ). 
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I nputs 0 utputs 
Harvest I Trophy Catch & l No-
Release Catch 
Licensed Commercial Fishers • 
Unlicensed Fishing • 
Accumulators • 
Stockpilers • 
Hunters • • 
Sportspersons • • 
Recreational Enthusiasts • • 
Social Fishers • 
Adventurers • 
Lovers of Open Space • • 
Observers • 
Preservationists • 
Fig 11. Fishing inputs and outputs. (Adapted from Kearney 2001) 
Bryan (1977), Holland and Ditton (1992), and Oh and Ditton (2006) also provide 
descriptions of similar angler expectations in their studies, though with very different 
conclusions about the overall effort types in each particular survey demographic, as 
discussed in the literature review. Kearney's list is intended to provide descriptions 
foundational for further applied research. The present proposal is a step in that direction. 
A statistical survey of charter effort is beyond the scope of this paper, so I must rely 
mostly on conversations with people involved in the fishery for my analysis. However, in 
the course of my research, it has become apparent that designing a questionnaire for 
fishermen to determine their reasons for fishing, similar to that used by Holland and 
Ditton (1992), and Oh and Ditton (2006) would benefit charter fishery management in the 
long run. 
4.3.2 Murphy Discussion 
Murphy states that providing for compensated, orderly growth in the halibut 
fisheries is essential for the future of the charter fishery. 27 Without it, the charter fishery 
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risks an in-season cessation of halibut ticket sales. This could devastate those sections of 
the charter fleet which market to NAN fishermen (mostly cruise ship passengers). 
Wikle (1991) cited concerns about the organizational component of queues (like 
Murphy's halibut tickets). But the primary concern with a queue regards the fisherman's 
time commitment. Those most able to spend time waiting, or who have sufficient 
flexibility in their fishing schedule, are most likely to secure harvesting privileges. Out-
of-state fishing effort (in Alaska for only a short time) would be less likely to benefit 
from any redistribution than in-state effort. Reissuing un-harvested halibut tickets in-
season would benefit all halibut fishermen, but mostly those fishermen whose valuation 
of an additional halibut increases while fishing, even though they considered the pre-
season value of securing halibut prohibitive (Koh et al. 2006). That is, the fishing 
experience itself gives rise to an increased willingness to pay more for the privilege to 
catch an additional fish after fishing has begun. 
If all the tickets went on sale at some point in the pre-season, there is a high 
probability they would be bought before the season opens. This would discriminate 
against anyone wishing to supplement their permitted allocation in-season. Barzel (1974) 
notes that to avoid discrimination of this sort, tickets would have to be available twice, 
once while the fisherman is planning the trip, and again in-season as halibut abundances 
and allocation permit. This could be achieved in a number of ways. One possibility is to 
have two pools of tickets. Another option is to allow the return of unused halibut tickets 
as Murphy (2006) suggests, which would also redistribute halibut to NAN fishermen. 
A key difference between Murphy's ticket program and the halibut lottery 
discussed below is the targeted recreational fisherman effort type. Although Murphy 
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provides two options for allocation in the current proposal, it was not his original intent to 
discriminate between the two recreational halibut sectors. In an effort to solicit more 
support from the Council, the state, and involved stakeholders, Murphy leaves this as an 
option in his later (2006) proposal. Selecting Murphy's second option (halibut tickets for 
the charter fleet only) would create a hybrid management scheme. I disagree with his 
first option, which uses halibut tickets as the sole distribution method for the entire 
recreational halibut fishery. With a cap (GHL, fishery CEY, etc.) on the allowed 
recreational halibut harvest, Murphy closes the fishery to anyone without a halibut ticket 
under his first option. The method I describe below is a hybrid plan, where users wishing 
access beyond the allowed bag limit would purchase additional harvest privileges as 
available. 
Still, Murphy's instinct as a charter operator is to include "the entire recreational 
fishery, since applying restrictions to just the charter sector will encourage more 
recreational fishermen to fish from private boats, thus avoiding comprehensive tallying of 
fish caught, but more importantly, exposing more novice boatmen to the dangerous 
waters of Alaska."28 Safety while fishing is always a concern, whether the fishing is a 
commercial or recreational endeavor. According to USCG testimony "the Coast Guard is 
not concerned with any growth in [the charter] industry sector with respect to safety." (9, 
NPFMC 2005a). This means that additional USCG licensed charter boat captains and 
vessels on the water do not pose a safety concern. The USCG testimony states that "it's 
common sense that.. .there's more experience in a commercial boat, no matter what kind 
of commercial boat it is, versus a recreational boat" (12, NPFMC 2005a). Future study 
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should be dedicated to considering any effort shifts to unguided halibut fishing as charter 
fishery management evolves. 
4.3.3 The Hybrid Approach 
Distribution among the varied recreational user types in the charter fishery 
requires a hybrid approach using flexible resource management tools, such as 
combinations of tools for both open-access and limited-access management. This is 
uncommon in fisheries management. For the most part management negotiations focus 
on finding the single tool most appropriate for a group instead of a suitable combination 
of tools. Instead of this focus, management should put more attention on the goals and 
intentions of fishermen in a particular fishery. The following is a brief discussion of 
available information on the characteristics of halibut charter fishermen, applicable to 
Southeast Alaska, although it has implications for the rest of the charter fishery as well. 
The Alaska charter businesses attract an extremely diverse group of users (Criddle 
2004). The charter operators facilitate halibut fishing for locals and travelers, for cruise 
ship passengers and week-long vacationers. People travel from all over the world to 
experience catching halibut. Visiting Sitka's Rocky-Gutierrez airport reveals large 
amounts of charter-caught halibut, boxed and frozen, and headed home with pleased 
fishermen. Lodges dot the Alaska coast from the Aleutians to the Canadian border, but 
fishermen along the Southcentral coast are frequently Alaska residents catching halibut 
for winter use. Southeast Alaska is where lodges dominate, offering luxury 
accommodations for wealthy out-of-state fishermen. According to ADFG, halibut 
fishermen in the charter fishery share at least one trait: many fishermen value halibut 
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primarily for the meat halibut provides, and have thus created a meat-fishery using 
recreational effort. 29 
In a 2005 study, the McDowell Group presented a detailed picture of the charter 
fishery (for all allowed species) in Sitka. Although non-specific about the particular 
species targeted by fishermen, it is an enlightening study. For example, the 2005 
estimated overall economic impact of the Sitka charter fishery reached $31 million (US). 
Of that total, charter clients spent approximately $23.1 million (US) in direct charter-
related expenses (McDowell Group 2005). To generate this revenue, Sitka hosted about 
10,400 non-cruise charter clients,30 who fished from 213 boats operated by 121 
independent businesses. The bulk of these charter clients fished under full vacation 
packages, spending four to five nights in Sitka, and paying an average of $2,000 for their 
fishing trip. A brief description of the typical non-cruise client in Sitka for 2005 is as 
follows. The fisherman is a 53-year old male, likely from the West coast of the United 
States, with a college degree and an annual income around $120,000 (US). He is most 
likely a member of a party of 4-5 like-minded fishermen. Men dominate the charter 
fishery in Sitka, accounting for nearly 90 percent of the non-cruise clients. Only 31 
percent of clients were under 45. Of the 57 percent of clients with at least a college 
degree, 35 percent held advanced degrees. California, at 32 percent, boasted the single 
highest source for Sitka non-cruise charter clients. Washington State accounted for 
another 24 percent, and the entire Western U.S. (including California and Washington) 
accounted for 74 percent of charter clients (McDowell Group 2005). This is a synopsis 
of one port in one year, and it does not include cruise ship passengers. If we include 
cruise ship passengers, other groups drawn to Sitka, and all the charter halibut fishermen 
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in other Alaskan ports, we are certain get a much more diverse group of fishermen than 
suggested by McDowell (2005) 
Rough estimates from ADFG show a substantial portion (more than 60 percent) of 
out-of-state charter effort in Area 2C. Area 3A shows a greater involvement of Alaskans 
in the charter fishery, around forty percent. Area 3A is also closer to Alaska's two main 
urban centers, Fairbanks and Anchorage. Halibut fishing effort from those cities and the 
surrounding area focuses on the Southcentral Alaskan coast. One reason why in-state 
charter effort is higher along the Southcentral coast may be because non-coastal Alaskan 
residents have greater costs associated with keeping and maintaining a personal vessel 
(transport and storage primarily). These fishermen find it more economical to hire a 
charter. Southeast Alaska residents, because of their close proximity to the sea, likely 
have lower costs in keeping a personal vessel, resulting in lower in-state demand for 
fishing charters. 31 
The present halibut distribution method does not satisfy this diversity, evident 
from the drawn out process to develop a long-term management strategy for the charter 
halibut fishery. Observing current charter management, we can assume that charter 
halibut harvests will remain under either a GHL or some other form of fixed or floating 
harvest cap, so the challenge is now to find a distribution tool for the charter fleet's 
limited allocation. This tool must be able to account for the expectations of out-of-state 
package deal fishermen, cruise ship passengers, and Alaska residents alike. Applying the 
input types discussed above (Figure 11) to the charter halibut fishery, we would expect to 
find any number of competitors, hunters, sportspersons, recreational enthusiasts, 
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stockpilers, and to a lesser extent social fishers, adventurers, and lovers of open space on 
the water at the same time, albeit unevenly distributed along Alaska's coast. 
Recent research recommends lotteries as the best choice for new limited access 
programs in recreational fisheries, since lotteries provide an "eminently fair" allocation 
method (23, Hardin 1969; Wilen 2001; Cox and Walters 2002; Criddle 2004). Koh et al. 
(2006) also suggest that a lottery is more equitable than a queue. I propose that halibut 
management consider lotteries already in place, such as those lotteries ADFG conducts 
for big-game distribution. 
ADFG holds lotteries for several terrestrial hunts, including Elk, Moose, Sheep, 
Muskox, Brown Bear, Caribou, and Mountain Goat. This means ADFG already has 
experts in lottery allocation, and this expertise could benefit implementation of a lottery 
for the charter halibut fishery. The easiest means to implement a lottery for halibut in 
Alaska would be to adapt ADFG's computer program to the fishery. After an 18-point 
check of all applications in the current ADFG lottery program, the program randomly 
assigns a number to each valid applicant. 32 At present, applicants to the hunt lotteries 
may not apply for the same hunt two years in a row.33 Conducted twice annually for the 
Winter and Spring draws, applications with the lowest numbers receive a permit until all 
the permits for the various hunts are distributed. ADFG employs one full-time 
programmer to run the lottery. In addition, ADFG employs six student interns 
seasonally, four full-time data entry staff who process the entire lottery program, and a 
program coordinator. 34 
Koh et al. (2006) recommends multiple lotteries under one allocation to meet the 
needs of different user groups. I propose a modification to hold two halibut draws. One 
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draw would serviCe licensed recreational fishermen for use either privately or on a 
charter. The second draw would provide charter operators with extra halibut tickets that 
they can pass to clients who might not have won extra halibut in the fishermen's lottery. 
This element is crucial for success, since charter operators depend frequently on repeat 
customers. They must be able to provide similar experiences to prior years for customers 
to return, and waiting to see if a client receives additional halibut in a lottery is 
unacceptable to many. 35 To prevent charter operator abuse of these tickets, such as 
increased trip fees pocketed by the charter business, the ADFG fee for these tickets 
would pass directly to the charter fisherman who uses the ticket. This should not be a 
concern for the clients, since the client would have paid for an additional ticket if he or 
she had won the lottery anyway. Charter operators would be required to notify clients of 
the additional state fees before the client uses the ticket, and the collection of fees could 
be done at either dockside from the client to ADFG employees, or sent in by the charter 
operator on behalf of the client. Additionally, charter operators could use these tickets 
for themselves or their crew (if properly licensed for recreational halibut fishing). 
Questions still linger about how this split would evolve. How many tickets could a 
charter operator receive? Would that number be determined from their trip history, or a 
percentage of that history? Would this split create 'charter barons' who hold greater 
control over the fishery, excluding new entrants from much growth? 
A lottery is the most equitable method for distributing the remaining halibut 
among those fishermen with who take time to plan their fishing trip, such as week-long 
lodge guests or Alaska residents. A lottery does little for no-advance notification (NAN) 
fishermen, such as cruise ship passengers who decide to fish only a day or two in 
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advance. At this time, the only data I have on fishing trip planning is the McDowell 
Report, focusing mostly on out-of-state effort. Participants in the study made their initial 
decision to travel eight months prior to the actual trip, on average. Participants took on 
average two additional months to plan their trip before making major travel 
arrangements, or 5.8 months in advance (McDowell 2006). Other anecdotal information 
on trip planning suggests that charter clients in 3A are mostly Alaska residents, and that 
clients in 2C are predominantly from out-of-state.36 In-state effort does not require 
extensive planning (e.g., travel and lodging), so it may be safe to say that a 6-month delay 
between actual booking and traveling to fish is a longer than average time span, 
considering all fishery participants. After the application deadline, the current Alaska 
lotteries take about six weeks to complete and provide draw results online (ADFG 2005b, 
2006c ). This time line would strain the patience of many fishermen who planned their 
trip months earlier. Conducting a halibut lottery several months in advance would 
accommodate trip planning for those willing to pay for anticipated landings greater than 
the regular license would permit. 
The hybrid plan using a lottery may be implemented as follows. ADFG provides 
an estimate of the coming season's halibut harvest in October the year prior.37 Once 
harvest estimates are available, management would provide enough halibut for the 
coming years' anticipated effort to allow at least a halibut or two per recreational license 
annually. At this new lower halibut removal level, ADFG would take the surplus 
(otherwise landed with higher bag limits as exists today) and distribute it in draw permits 
for the coming season's lotteries. Allowing time for fishermen to apply, and then 
following the six-week timeline already in place for other Alaska game hunts, a halibut 
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lottery should be complete in time for the beginning of that year's fishing season. Since 
most participants (65 percent) used the internet for trip planning, research, and booking, 
providing an online application for a lottery is ideal in addition to any printed materials 
(McDowell 2006). Below is an outline for the hybrid plan, presented in order of 
implementation. 
1. Determine halibut allocation to charter users under GHL, fishery CEY, separate 
accountability alternative (Falvey 2006), or other cap program. 
2. Determine halibut bag limits for charter users to X per day and/or X per year, as 
allowed by abundance estimates and estimates of user demand. 
3. The bag limits for the coming season are based on an estimate of effort for that season, 
and should represent only a portion of the overall halibut harvest. The remaining halibut 
from the annual allocation will be distributed through a lottery or queue. 
4. Conduct surplus halibut distribution. 
A. Conduct a seasonal lottery on a per fish basis for fishermen planning their 
trips. Access to the numbers of fish distributed to fishermen could vary higher 
than current bag limits, up to the total allocation for the charter fleet. 
OR, depending on Council and public preference 
B. Following the Murphy Proposal (2006), provide access for pre-season stamp 
purchase for fishermen planning their trips. The maximum number of stamps per 
fisherman is pre-determined to not exceed X per day and/or X per year. 
5. Current Dockside monitoring practices and the logbook program through ADFG would 
continue. 
6. Whether through a lottery or stamp program, fishermen would be obliged to check 
their tags with ADFG (dockside monitors) at the conclusion of their trip, regardless of 
actual landings. Tags not checked would count as landed fish, adding some average 
amount to total charter landings, and fishermen not returning tags would be penalized in 
some fashion, such as by exclusion from the fishery for some period oftime. 
Other modifications will be needed to prevent cheating and methods to cover the 
overhead required to collect tags and record recreational harvests. Murphy's (2006) user 
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fee provision, which would provide a dedicated cash flow for administration of the hybrid 
plan, is useful. In addition, determining recreational halibut permit bag limits and the 
numbers of halibut tickets or draw tags permitted for each fisherman requires access to 
detailed information on halibut landings and fishing effort in the charter fleet. Proposing 
these limits is a task for managers, and I leave the various limits unspecified in my 
proposal. One possibility for this reduction could come from the recent suggestion of the 
Halibut Coalition. This group of commercial IFQ holders recommended a reduction in 
charter halibut bag limits to one halibut per day per charter client across Alaska. This 
may help in some ways, but simply reducing bag limits will discriminate against the 
stockpiler fisherman. 38 Still, reducing bag limits for recreational charter users to a level 
below the predicted halibut harvest cap currently in use is a key step to implementing the 
hybrid approach. The cap is currently a GHL, but depending on current management 
negotiations the cap could be a GHL, fishery CEY, or some other form of cap which 
reflects the desired definition of optimality in stock management. A limited bag limit for 
the recreational halibut license allows anyone wishing the experience of catching a 
halibut (with at least one halibut allowed) to do so. The bag limit would facilitate NAN 
fishing experiences, such as those users coming from cruise ships and other forms of 
tourism not directly aimed at fishing. 
The current suite of options under Council consideration is a patchwork of more 
traditional tools. They include provisions for limiting charter vessel trips to one per day, 
preventing crew aboard charter vessels from retaining halibut while on charter, 
establishing annual allowed harvests per recreational permit to four or five halibut, 
creating a minimum harvest size, creating a maximum harvest size for the second halibut 
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harvested, daily bag limits of one fish for either a month in the season or for the entire 
season establishing a season closure in August or September, and/or a weekly one-day 
closure. In addition, the Council is also considering a moratorium on additional vessel 
entry to the charter fishery, charter inclusion in the commercial quota program, and a 
hard cap in lieu ofthe current GHL (NPFMC 2006c). The hybrid plan would replace this 
patchwork of distributional tools with one succinct combination that has the potential to 
better meet the needs of the increasing number of fishermen who rely on the charter 
fishery. 
4.3.4 Constraints on Management Change 
The hybrid plan, or any other plan for the charter fishery, faces significant 
obstacles. Those obstacles are the procedural delays inherent in the Council management 
process, discussed earlier. Only in September 2006, did ADFG release the final charter 
halibut harvest estimates for 2005. A full year, and another charter season, has elapsed 
between the close of the 2005 season and ADFG's release of a final harvest estimate. 
Harvests in Area 3A were a little higher than anticipated, with 3,689,000 pounds of 
halibut landed. This is only one percent above the area's GHL. Harvests in Area 2C 
were again far above the established GHL. Charter fishermen in Southeast Alaska landed 
nearly 2,000,000 pounds of halibut, 36 percent over the 2C GHL of 1,432,000 pounds. 
This surprised ADFG, which estimated that Area 2C would exceed the 2005 GHL by 
only 207,000 pounds.39 ADFG estimates that the charter fishery in Area 2C will again 
have exceeded the GHL, this time by more than 40 percent, for the 2006 charter halibut 
season (NPFMC 2006c ). 
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As noted earlier, the charter committee presented their final recommendations at 
the Council meeting in December 2006, and focused on reducing harvests in Area 2C. 
Acknowledging these recommendations, the Council began the review process for a wide 
range of options, presented above (minimum size limits, crew harvest provisions, etc). 
At least another year will go by while the Council deliberates on the charter halibut 
fishery, with further delay at the federal level. According to the Special Assistant to the 
Commissioner of ADFG, 
"These [2005] estimates demonstrate the need for a greater diversity of 
management tools that can be timely and proactively applied to control 
harvests within established allocation guidelines. The Department 
[ADFG] continues to believe the best mechanism to achieve this is an 
amendment to the Halibut Act to allow a state delegation for selected 
management authorities."40 
Although recreational fisheries are normally the purview of state management, 
halibut are managed at the Council level as per regulations in the Halibut Act (16 U.S.C 
Sec. 773). ADFG does have indirect enforcement and data-gathering responsibilities for 
halibut at the Council level, but the substance of management promulgation remains out 
of their control. The Council process is purposefully laborious in an effort to include as 
many voices in the decision making process as possible. Considering the issues present 
in Alaska's charter halibut fishery, the Council process fails to promote effective 
management. Management decisions are reached within months in ADFG, whereas it 
takes years at the Council and federal levels. Usually citizen advisory committees bring 
issues to the Alaska Board of Fisheries (Board), as is the case with Council issues. After 
debate, the Board may send an issue to the Commissioner of ADFG. Following two 
reviews, one by the Attorney General and another by ADFG, the resolution to an issue is 
implemented. This frequently happens in less than a year. The Commissioner can also 
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issue emergency orders for more rapid implementation of management changes (Ginter 
2006). One example is the emergency order issued for the 2006 charter halibut fishery in 
Area 2C. In an effort to reduce landings (of any species) from charter vessels, the order 
prevented charter boat captains, guides, and crew from keeping fish while on a charter 
(NPFMC 2006c ). 
The situation m Canada presents an interesting basis for comparison. The 
Minister of Fisheries in British Columbia announced a 12 percent ceiling in 2003 for the 
combined charter and non-charter recreational halibut harvests. The 12 percent derives 
from the overall commercial-recreational harvest weights in British Columbia, and was 
set to provide room for additional growth in the recreational fishery. This cap mimics a 
similar proposal for a charter harvest cap in the United States, now awaiting review by 
the IPHC (Falvey 2006). 41 In 2001, the recreational halibut harvest in Canada was at 
nine percent of overall landings. In 2005, it was predicted that recreational halibut 
harvests had met their twelve percent cap. Now Canada is faced with controlling 
recreational halibut harvest growth. The tools considered are quota purchase from the 
commercial sector to increase recreational harvests, or decreasing bag limits and fishing 
times. The recreational halibut fishery lacks infrastructure and solid organization in 
Canada, preventing any easy transfer of quota to the recreational sector. An option is to 
increase recreational license fees to account for halibut quota purchase, but the process of 
increasing fees is time-consuming, taking at least three years to complete (Gislason 
2006). Canada faces a similar challenge to that of the Council in Alaska. Exchanging the 
elaborate Council process for Ministerial oversight in Canada might yield a faster 
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resolution, but imposing new rules on a group of fishermen who treat their individual 
right to fish halibut as a birth right will prove difficult. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
For fourteen years, the Council process has failed to provide a solid management 
plan for the Alaska charter halibut fishery. Management at the Council and National 
level has failed to grasp the complexity of the recreational halibut fisheries in Alaska, 
stemming from a nearly absent consideration of why people fish. Understanding why 
people fish is a much more complex task when the purpose to fish is not income. 
Because the Council process traditionally concerns itselfwith commercial fisheries, there 
is no mechanism or expertise in place to analyze a fishery by effort type. ADFG and 
other state fisheries management organizations have done a better job with recreational 
fisheries because of long time involvement in recreational fisheries management. ADFG 
could do well with halibut, but because of the Halibut Act (16 U.S.C Sec. 773), ADFG's 
management scope is limited for recreational halibut fisheries. This arrangement is far 
from ideal, but it is what exists at the present time. 
A review of current literature on recreational fisheries provided direction to a 
more appropriate assessment method for the charter halibut fleet. The identification of 
recreational user types, the effort inputs unique to each type and each recreational fishery, 
is fundamental to an understanding of the recreational fishery. It is also an element 
apparently absent from Council management practice. State fisheries management has 
made some progress in this regard, perhaps in part because the literature on recreational 
user types is still very limited. Working within the bounds of current natural resource 
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management practice m the U.S., I have proposed a way in which charter halibut 
management might be improved. It includes an assessment of recreational effort inputs. 
Following the work of Kearney (2001) and others, this sort of assessment is possible, 
though a daunting task to many. Federal and regional management is unfamiliar with this 
sort ofimpact study. Although consideration of recreational effort inputs is not in writing 
with ADFG, consideration of management impacts on recreational fishermen are already 
an integral part of their management process. This is encouraging for assessments of 
recreational fisheries outside of the Council process, such as inshore and inland U.S. 
fisheries. Globally, and dependent on local management practices, a review process for 
recreational user types would probably benefit the maintenance of other recreational 
fisheries as well. 
At more informal levels, many involved in fisheries already see the need to 
accommodate different fishing preferences. Murphy's (2006) proposal shows promise in 
this regard. There are still better ways to provide for diverse fishing interests as reflected 
in the hybrid plan proposed in this paper, but Murphy's interest to provide an equitable 
distribution through queuing for halibut is also one major step in the right direction. 
Other fishermen have also commented on the Alaska charter fishery's unique diversity.42 
The unique element is the personal stake charter operators have in the fishery. Charter 
operators are not the legal harvesters of the fish their clients target. Instead charter 
operators provide fisheries expertise, from fish finding abilities to safety at sea, that 
allows the recreational halibut fishery to flourish. This is why I support a split in halibut 
ticket availability between charter operators and charter fishermen. Under my proposal 
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charter operators would make their allocation in tickets available to their own clients in 
response to demand. 
Articulating user-group types will help recreational fisheries management find its 
footing globally, but it will not cure this delayed management response to the Alaska 
halibut charter fishery. The Halibut Act prevents the sort of state management attention 
available to other U.S. recreational fisheries. Too much responsibility rests with the 
Council and NMFS in this case, and not enough with the management body closest to the 
halibut charter fishery. Dynamic options such as the hybrid plan I propose will struggle 
under the deliberate Council process. If ADFG held management responsibility for all 
recreational halibut effort, I trust that a long-term resolution would come to the current 
charter management impasse. State management is familiar with the tools in the hybrid 
plan, and ADFG could provide an efficient transition from hunting lotteries to a lottery 
for halibut with their in-house expertise. The Council process was created to provide 
more regional or localized oversight to U.S. fisheries. Now the Council, through the 
Halibut Act, has taken oversight away from the group most readily equipped to manage 
the recreational non-charter and charter halibut fisheries. When ADFG has the ability to 
manage the recreational charter halibut fishery, we can expect to see positive change. 
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2 Rob Bentz, Personal Communication, 28 April 2006; Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal 
Communication, 19 February 2007. 
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15 The Administrative Procedures Act of 1946 (2005) is meant to provide a certain 
transparency in the rule-making process. It basically requires a period of public comment 
on any proposed rule, according to certain criteria, before a rule is final. This provides 
for the public comment period and published proposed rules in the Federal Register 
(NMFS 1997). There is a clause for exceptions if a certain rule finds good cause, in that 
"public procedure [i.e. comment] would be impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest" (Title 5, US. Code, section 553(b)(B), 2005 edition). 
16 Rob Bentz, Personal Communication, 28 April 2006. 
17 Jay Ginter, Personal Communication, 3 March 2006. 
18 Jason Gasper, Personal Communication, 15 March 2006. 
19 It is of note that ADFG never supported the IFQ program, from the program's 
inception to its eventual removal in late 2005. Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal 
Communication, 19 February 2007. 
20 Bob Ward, Personal Communication, 9 January 2006. 
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29 Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal Communication, 12 October 2006. 
30 Most cruise-ship passenger information concerning their spending habits (including 
fishing) is confidential and was indicated as such in the McDowell report. 
31 Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal Communication, 12 October 2006. 
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32 Steven Schwartz (Personal Communication, 2 October 2006) at ADFG provided a little 
more detail about the 18-point application check. "The applications are checked for 
completeness - some fields are required by regulation. The hunt field is checked in 
several ways - Is the number valid, is that hunt offered this year. The hunts and money 
must balance - did the hunter pay for all the hunts they applied for - did they pay more 
that was necessary. Does the hunter meet the requirements for the hunt - some hunt are 
Alaska residents only - some are nonresidents only, some require guides, some require 
certification for weapons such as archery or black powder or muzzle loaders. Applicants 
are restricted to a certain number of species they can apply for ... etc." 
33 ADFG receives numerous requests annually to switch their lottery to a point system. 
Please see section 2 for a brief discussion of point systems in lotteries. 
34 Steven Schwartz, Personal Communication, 2 October 2006. 
35 Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal Communication, 19 February 2007. 
36 Bob Ward, Personal Communication, 23 August 2006; Dan Falvey, Personal 
Communication, 15 July 2006; Linda Behnken, Personal Communication, 22 July 2006. 
37 Jane DiCosimo, Personal Communication, 6 October 2006. 
38 Douglas Vincent-Lang, Personal Communication, 14 December 2006. 
39 Jane DiCosimo, Personal Communication, 6 October 2006. 
40 Jane DiCosimo, Personal Communication, 6 October 2006. 
41 The IPHC is in the assessment business, not the allocation business. They make 
recommendations, adopted domestically, for commercial allocation, but they do not 
regularly determine allocation between sectors as the separate accountability alternative 
proposes. This will be a major issue in the months to come. Douglas Vincent-Lang, 
Personal Communication, 19 February 2007. 
42 Bob Ward, Personal Communication, 23 August, 2006. 
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